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Abstract 
Human languages include vast numbers of learned, arbitrary 
signal-meaning mappings but also many complex signal-
meaning mappings that are systematically related to each 
other (i.e. not arbitrary).  Although arbitrariness and 
systematicity are clearly related, the development of the two 
in communication systems has been explored independently.  
We present an experiment in which participants invent signs 
from scratch to refer to a set of real concepts that share 
semantic features.  Through interaction, the systematic re-use 
of arbitrary elements emerges.   
Keywords: arbitrariness; systematicity; signs; language 
evolution; emergent communication 
Introduction 
Two of language’s most fascinating properties, arbitrariness 
and systematicity, characterize the nature of the mappings 
between signals and meanings. A sign is arbitrary when 
there is no inherent relationship between the signal and its 
meaning.  For example, the sounds in the word “house” 
have nothing to do with what the word means.  In contrast, 
some subsets of signs in a language are systematic, in that 
signals for similar meanings share an element.  The 
referring expressions “big house”, “red house”, “big apple”, 
and “red apple” are an example.  In language, words are 
often arbitrary while multi-word phrases are systematic.  
How does this property, the systematic re-use of arbitrary 
elements, emerge in communication systems? 
Recent experimental work has shown that people are able 
to successfully communicate in the absence of conventional 
communication systems, often by creating novel signs.  (de 
Ruiter et al., 2007; Galantucci, 2005; Garrod et al., 2007; 
Healey et al., 2002; Scott-Phillips, 2009).  The first signs 
people produce in these situations are often not arbitrary, 
but rather iconic or motivated in some other way.  
(Galantucci, 2005; Garrod et al., 2007)  
Psycholinguistic work has demonstrated how referring 
expressions can change during dialogue.  (Garrod & 
Doherty, 1994; Pickering & Garrod, 2004).  In particular, 
conversational partners collaborate to establish definite 
references, and allowing their referring expressions to 
shorten.  (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986).  This simplification 
causes iconic signs in novel communication systems to 
become more arbitrary.  (Garrod et al., 2007)  
Kirby (2001) demonstrated how, given a set of arbitrary 
signs, systematicity might evolve.  Simple artificial agents 
learn sets of signs and detect chance regularities in them 
(e.g., that the words for two red items both contain the 
syllable “ka”).  Over many generations of agents producing 
signals for new meanings (meanings they didn’t learn 
signals for) according to the regularities they observed, a set 
of signs can become systematic.  Kirby et al. (2008) 
confirmed the result in human experimental participants.   
Taking these two lines of research together, we have one 
route to the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements: people 
generate signs that are non-arbitrary, those signs become 
arbitrary as they simplify, by chance there are a few signal-
meaning regularities, generations of people propagate these 
regularities, and the language becomes systematic.  It’s this 
longer history of a communication system, from the birth of 
the first sign to a set of signs which systematically re-uses 
arbitrary elements, that the current work aims to explore. 
Goldin-Meadow et al. (1995)’s study on the emergence of 
systematicity in homesign (gestures created by deaf, non-
signing children for use with their caretakers) covers this 
range. They found that, in the early stages of the homesign 
systems, a particular value of a particular gesture component 
(such as a 1” distance between the thumb and index finger) 
was used in gestures for just one object.  In the later stages, 
the homesigners apparently collapsed some distinctions 
between objects and applied some values of gesture 
components to more than one object, increasing the 
systematicity of his or her set of gestures.  This work shows 
that systematicity doesn’t require complete arbitrariness – 
the recurrences between signal components and meaning 
components weren’t chance.  Unfortunately, we cannot 
know whether homesigners systems would have been 
systematic from the earliest stages, given similar-enough 
objects. 
Here we present an exploration of the emergence of the 
systematic re-use of arbitrary elements in one controlled 
experiment.  In this way, we can probe the relationship 
between systematicity and arbitrariness as communication 
systems develop. 
1971
Experiment 
Methods 
 
Participants  32 University of Edinburgh students 
participated in exchange for £12.  All were native British 
English speakers.  Participants who played together didn’t 
know each other. 
 
Apparatus Partners were seated in separate soundproof 
booths with computers.  The experiment was run using the 
Pigeon software (Healey et al., 2002), which presented the 
item to draw each trial and provided a shared online 
whiteboard.  Participants guessed and corrected their 
partners’ guesses in an MSN Messenger chat window. 
 
Stimuli The items were chosen to share salient semantic 
features; each item can be thought of as one of five entity 
types (such as person or building) that relates to one of ten 
themes (such as education or agriculture).  There were 26 
core items, appearing with different frequencies.  These are 
shown in Figure 1.  Additionally, there were 14 filler items, 
occurring just once per game, intended to prevent 
participants from assuming that their set of items was 
closed. The items occurred in random order.  Participants 
knew nothing about the items in advance.  In particular, 
were never exposed to a list of the items. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.   One set of signs that emerged from the experiment.  Each sign is the last occurrence of that item in the game.  
Signs are arranged according to the semantic features of the items, not by chronological order of the trials.  Italics 
distinguish which participant was the Drawer that trial.  The set is highly systematic, in that signs in many of the rows and 
columns share an element.   Also notice how arbitrary the elements have become. 
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Game  A team was allowed just one guess per trial.  A team 
won 1 point for every correct guess but lost 1 point for any 
incorrect guess or drawing that included a symbol or 
convention.  The goal was to win as many points as possible 
in the two hours of play.  Participants from the three top-
scoring teams were entered into a prize draw for an 
additional £20. 
 
Procedure  Each trial, one participant was the Drawer and 
other was the Guesser.  The Drawer saw an item (such as 
professor) on his screen and was allowed to draw 
immediately.  The Drawer drew with a mouse, had only 
black ink, and could not erase anything.  The Guesser saw 
everything the Drawer drew immediately, on her screen.  
The Guesser did not see the Drawer's mouse movements 
when he was not drawing, and could not draw herself.  
When she was ready, the Guesser guessed by typing into a 
chat window.  The Drawer stopped drawing immediately 
and either confirmed or corrected the guess in the chat 
window.  Players advanced themselves to the next trial. 
Every six trials, the participants switched Drawer and 
Guesser roles.  The participants played for two hours. 
Results: Systematicity 
Figure 1 shows one of the systems that emerged from this 
game.  Notice how systematic it is: the drawings in many of 
the rows and columns share an element.  For example, the 
drawings for items relating to university education (in the 
second row) each have a filled-in diamond.  As another 
example, four of the drawings for activities/situations (in the 
second column) have rows of squiggly lines.  
To enable analysis of systematicity, each set of drawings 
was printed on a page in a table, organized so that rows and 
columns contain drawings for similar items (as in Figure 1).  
A single coder examined each row and each column for any 
element shared among two or more drawings.  If there was a 
 
 
Figure 2.  One Mixed Last set of signs.  Each drawing in a row or column is the last from a different game of the experiment 
(i.e. from different pairs of players).  Notice how little systematicity the set has. 
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shared element, the coder marked which of the drawings in 
that row or column included it. 
There are 26 drawings and each drawing is inspected 
twice – once as a member of its row and once as a member 
of its column.  Thus, each set of drawings can receive a total 
score of 52.  The total score divided by 52 is our 
systematicity score (a percentage). 
For each of the 12 games from the experiment, we coded 
the set of First drawings (the first drawing of each item from 
that pair of participants) and the set of Last drawings (the 
last drawing of each item).  To put their systematicity scores 
in context, we constructed 12 sets each of two kinds of 
comparison sets: Mixed First and Mixed Last.  The Mixed 
First (or Last) sets were each composed of the First (or Last) 
drawings from different games of the experiment (i.e. from 
different pairs of players).  For each Mixed set, for each 
item (e.g., teacher), we choose at random which of the 
games the drawing would be from, with the restriction that 
the drawings in each row and each column would be from 
different games.  Figure 2 shows one Mixed Last set.  
The coder marked these 48 sets in random order and 
blind. 
A different coder marked three randomly chosen sets of 
each category independently.  Her scores were strongly 
correlated with those of the original coder (Spearman’s ρ  = 
0.82, p = 0.001). 
Figure 3A shows the mean systematicity for the Last and 
Mixed Last sets of signs.  (MLast = 42.79, SD = 18.95; 
MMixed Last = 19.39, SD = 6.32) Last sets of signs are more 
systematic than Mixed Last sets of signs.  That is, signs 
drawn at the end of the games re-use elements more than 
can be attributed to the tendency across pairs of players to 
draw these items the same way (roughly, iconicity) – they 
are truly systematic.  A Mann–Whitney U Test confirmed 
this (p < 0.005).  
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Figure 3.  Mean systematicity (%) and confidence 
intervals (confidence level = 95%) for First, Mixed First, 
Last, and Mixed Last sets of signs. Last sets are more 
systematic than Mixed Last.  First sets are more systematic 
than Mixed First. 
 
How did Last sets of signs get to be systematic?  It turns 
out that First sets of signs are also truly systematic.  Figure  
2B shows the mean systematicity for First and Mixed First 
sets of signs. (MFirst = 47.76, SD = 11.85; MMixed First = 22.28, 
SD = 11.67)   A Mann-Whitney U Test confirmed that the 
First sets of signs have significantly higher systematicity 
scores than the Mixed First sets of signs (p < 0.001).  
Further, as Figure 4 illustrates, there’s a strong correlation 
between the First and Last systematicity of the sets.  
(Spearman’s ρ  = 0.62, p <  0.05). 
 
 
Figure 4.  Scatterplot of Last against First Systematicity 
(%).   The ranking of the First sets of signs by systematicity 
correlates with that of the corresponding Last sets of signs. 
Results: Arbitrariness 
To measure the arbitrariness of the signs produced in the 
experiment, we followed Fay et al. (2008) and had new 
participants guess what they meant.  12 University of 
Edinburgh students, all native British English speakers, 
participated in exchange for one chance in a £25 prize draw 
for each correct guess.  The experiment was run online, and 
lasted approximately 15 minutes.  Participants learned about 
the original game, and that the drawings they’d see would 
be from different games and different points in the games, 
in random order. Each trial, a participant saw a screenshot 
of the whiteboard at the end of the trial in the original game.  
He guessed the meaning of it by clicking on one of 26 
buttons, one for each possible item.  Each participant was 
presented with the First drawings of each core item from 
one randomly-assigned original game and the Last drawings 
of each core item from a different randomly-assigned 
original game.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Mean identification accuracy (%) and 
confidence intervals (confidence level = 95%) for First and 
Last sets of signs.  First sets of signs are more accurately 
identified than Last. 
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Figure 5 shows the mean identification rates (as 
proportions correct) for First and Last sets of signs. (MFirst = 
64.08, SD = 12.37; MLast = 45.42, SD = 6.86)  First sets of 
signs were more accurately identified than Last sets of 
signs.  A Mann–Whitney U Test confirmed this (p < 0.001).  
This suggests that the signs became more arbitrary over the 
course of the games.  
Discussion 
We’ve presented an experiment in which the systematic re-
use of arbitrary elements emerges.  Last sets of signs are 
systematic, and becoming more arbitrary. 
While previous work has explored the “evolution” of 
systematicity, this experiment has shown systematicity in 
the very first signs people use with each other.  It appears to 
simply emerge, without explicit design on the part of the 
participants, as a natural part of dialogue. 
Where does this initial systematicity come from? One 
might expect that the first time a player draws a certain item 
(say, school bus) with his partner, he draws it no 
differently than if he were drawing with a new partner.  But 
if this were the case, the First sets would have been no more 
systematic than the Mixed First sets.  Instead, when drawing 
items for the first time, players seem to have referenced 
previous drawings of related items.  Consider Figure 6, in 
which one pair’s first drawing of school bus, which 
occurred after another primary education item (teacher) 
had been drawn, is contrasted with three pairs’ first 
drawings of school bus, each of which occurred before 
any other primary education item had been drawn.  The 
former drawing for school bus includes elements found 
in the previous drawing of teacher, viz. the chalkboard 
and two children - elements not found in the other pairs’ 
first drawings for school bus. 
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Figure 5.  One pair’s first drawings for teacher (A) 
and then school bus (B), contrasted with three other 
pairs’ first drawings for school bus (C – E). 
 
Thus, the systematicity results presented here apply not just 
to iconic reference to tangible objects, but to communication 
in general.  
A common (albeit often implicit) assumption in the 
literature is that a novel communication system will first 
become arbitrary and then develop systematicity. For 
example, Garrod et al. (2007) say they offer an account of 
the “evolution of sets of icons into sets of symbols, and of 
sets of symbols into symbol systems.”  In contrast, the 
current work suggests that proper systematicity need not 
wait for arbitrariness.   
Similarly, the current work shows that, as sets of signs 
become more arbitrary, they don’t necessarily become less 
systematic.  Structure can be retained while the elements 
become arbitrary. Garrod et al. (2007) suggested this, but 
didn’t explore systematicity directly. 
We’ve presented a paradigm that allows one to explore 
arbitrariness and systematicity in one experiment.  Future 
work should explore the many issues surrounding the 
interaction of the two properties, as well as the transmission 
to others of communication systems which make systematic 
re-use of arbitrary elements. 
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